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Abstract - As a system becomes more complex, the 
uncertainty in the operating conditions increases. 
In such a system, implementing a precise failure 
analysis in early design stage is vital. However, 
there is a lack of applicable methodology that 
shows how to implement failure analysis in the 
early design phase to achieve a robust design. The 
main purpose of this paper is to present a 
framework to design a complex engineered system 
resistant against various factors that may cause 
failures, when design process is in the conceptual 
phase and information about detailed system and 
component is unavailable. Within this framework, 
we generate a population of feasible designs from a 
seed functional model, and simulate and classified 
failure scenarios. We also develop a design selection 
function to compare robust score for candidate 
designs, and produce a preference ranking. We 
implement the proposed method on the design of an 
aerospace monopropellant propulsion system. 
Keywords: failure analysis; robust design; design 
complex systems; conceptual design; cost-risk 
analysis 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
The number of parts in complex engineered systems is 
increasing rapidly. For instance, the components only in an 
integrated system is expected to be double every year as 
Gordon Moore predicted properly. Therefore, the interaction 
between various parts of the system, and between the system 
and external factors gets more complicated as technology 
and market demand is changing. The complicated 
interactions cause different type of uncertainties, and 
unexpected uncertainties can cause undesired behavior of 
the system or even catastrophic failures.  
An important concept in designing complex engineered 
systems, is to ensure that the behavior of the system in 
undesired and uncertain situations is determined early in the 
design phase, prior to the manufacturing and operational life 
of the system.  It requires to conduct a failure analysis in the 
conceptual design phase when the component model of the 
system and design specifications have not been developed 
yet. Failure analysis in early design phase help the designers 
to find strategies to improve the design to enable the system 
cope with the uncertainties during the operational life, as 
well as reduce the design revisions in further design steps 
shapers [1] 
To study the failure behavior of a system in the early design 
stage, modeling and simulation of the failure scenarios are 
the necessary steps. In many complex engineered systems, 
the characterization of the system is represented using a 
component model. However, when developing a new design, 
or in the early design phase, there is no component-level 
model available, and typically the set of components is not 
selected. Because of this, we came up with the idea of using 
functional model to study the system’s failure behavior in 
early design phase, to achieve a robust design. 
An overall description of our proposed design methodology 
is provided as follows. Developing a functional model is the 
first step. To develop a functional model for a complex 
engineered system, all the functions and flows and 
operational modes should be defined based on the system 
requirements and expert knowledge. Each function can have 
different operational modes: nominal, degraded, and failed. 
Next step is simulation of the system failure behavior. We 
have developed an open access tool in Python to simulate 
failure scenarios using functions, flows, and modes. The 
    536 
 
 
IJRE | Vol. 5 No. 9 | September-October 2018 | E. Keshavarzi et al. 
unique failure scenarios provide information on the 
probability of having undesired end states. Applying the 
cost-risk model, the designer evaluates the cost of a design 
versus the robustness of the design against a failure. If the 
design fulfills the requirements, the process ends. Otherwise, 
a new design is generated by modifying the functional 
model. The program runs until the search algorithm 
achieves the design with the optimal robust score. Fig. 1 
shows the flowchart for our proposed method. Green boxes 
represents the steps that are required to be done by designers 
and blue boxes are produced by software. 
Domain Functions, 
Flows, Modes and 
Conditions 
Functional Model 
for Conceptual 
Design  
Python Input File 
Fault Scenarios 
Generation 
Software   
Resilience Scoring 
Function 
Alternative 
Functional Topology 
Generator   
IBFM Toolkit 
Cost Model to 
Balance Design 
and Risk Cost 
Green: User
Blue: Software
Does the Design 
Meet 
the Termination 
Condition ? 
No
User Knowledge 
End Yes
 
Fig. 1. Proposed framework for robust design in 
conceptual phase 
This paper provides an applicable framework that shows the 
designers how to implement failure analysis and achieve a 
robust design in early design phase, when information about 
components is not available. We illustrate how to develop a 
functional model, simulate failure behavior of the system, 
and evaluate robustness of a design in early design phase. 
We implement the proposed approach in early design phase 
of an aerospace monopropellant propulsion system and 
achieve the design with optimal cost and resistance against 
failure.  The material of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 proposes a clear and consistent definition of 
robust design, and carefully disentangles it from reliability 
and resilient design. Section 3 describes different failure 
analysis methods and our logic to select functional model to 
study the failure behavior of the system. Section 4 illustrates 
how to represent a design applying a functional model. 
Section 5 proposes a cost-risk function to evaluate cost of a 
design and it’s robustness against failure. Section 6 presents 
generating different designs and search algorithm. In section 
7, we apply the proposed method to find the robust design 
for an aerospace monopropellant propulsion system. Section 
8 is the result and finally, section 9 provides conclusion and 
summary. 
II. ROBUST DESIGN 
Failure analysis is the first step to design a complex 
engineered system and the strategies to make it a robust 
system must be designed into the system from the beginning, 
because as we go forward in the design process making 
changes is more complicated and expensive [1]. 
Design strategies used for advancing reliability are 
implemented for the purpose of advancing robustness in a 
system; however, there is meaningful difference between 
these concepts. Reliability is the ability of a system to 
perform nominally for a specific period of time. In fact, 
reliability is the probability of success or availability of a 
component/system for a specified period of time [2]. 
Reliability concentrates more on “why and how” components 
or systems may fail or have failed. Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and 
event tree analysis are known techniques to study reliability 
[3]. Practice has shown that the main issue of these 
techniques is the requirement of the component-level detail 
of the system from the beginning of the design process.  
Robustness is where the system’s performance is minimum 
sensitive to internal and external uncertainties that can cause 
failure [4-6]. The ability to overcome such uncertainties 
should be embedded into the system from the beginning. 
Uncertainty is the lack of ability to determine something 
precisely [7, 8]. Uncertainty management is an important 
concept in the design process of complex engineered systems. 
Reducing uncertainty when designing a system results in 
more efficient system with less cost.  
Resilience can be defined as a system’s ability to recover 
from a failure. Recovery from a failure is an alternative to 
reducing uncertainty. There are different ways to recover 
from uncertain events, including flexibility, Monitoring and 
Automated Contingency Management (ACM).  
Flexibility is the ability of a system to respond to changes in 
initial requirements and objectives, after it starts operating, in 
a timely and cost-efficient way [9]. Keshavarzi et al, 
developed a strategy to apply flexibility in designing a 
complex engineered system to cope with epistemic 
uncertainty during the system operation lifetime [10, 11]. An 
ACM system adapts automatically and allows some 
degradation in the system performance when failure occurs 
with the goal of still achieving the mission [12-15]. For 
example, taking photos with less resolution is applying ACM 
when the mission dictates possessing an image. Yodo et al. 
provide a literature survey of existing studies in engineering 
resilience from a system design perspective, with the focus 
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on engineering resilience metrics and the strategies to 
quantify those metrics [16]. To improve reliability, 
robustness or resiliency of a design, failure analysis is a 
necessary step. In most existing failure analysis methods, 
system designers need a precise model of system 
components to be able to study complex behavior of the 
system. However, in early phase of design process, specific 
set of components have not yet been selected and such 
detailed models of the complete system is not available. 
Because of this lack of methods to study failure behavior in 
the early design phase, the idea of representing the complex 
system by only its intended functionality is proposed as part 
of our methodology. The following section discusses failure 
analysis using functional models. 
 
III. FAILURE ANALYSIS 
An engineered system is defined as an assemblage of sub-
systems, hardware/software components, and people 
designed to perform a set of tasks to satisfy specified 
functional requirements and constraints [17]. The traditional 
approach for designing an engineered system is to establish a 
pre-defined set of requirements based on market studies and 
best estimate extrapolations of the current state and then find 
the optimal design to satisfy the requirements [18]. However, 
these approaches are inadequate to respond to changes in 
initial requirements and uncertain events. This can lead to 
failure if the system is faced with significantly different 
conditions than the ones predicted.  
As a system becomes more complex, the uncertainty in the 
operating conditions increases. In such a system, 
implementing a precise failure analysis in early design stage 
is vital [19]. There are different types of failure analysis 
techniques for complex systems [20-27], like probabilistic 
methods [28, 29], or reliability techniques [30, 31], or 
approaches based on observations analysis [32]. Studies have 
shown that the early design stage is the best time to catch 
potential failures and anomalies [33]. However, in the early 
design phase, decisions about the specific set of components 
is not made, and a component model is not available. The 
idea of using functional model, instead of component model, 
to design a complex system is of increasing interest. A 
functional model in systems engineering is a structured 
representation of the functions to meet system requirements. 
The goal of developing a functional model is to describe the 
system behavior and determine vulnerable parts of the design, 
resulting in potential system improvement, particularly 
helpful in the early design stage when the detailed 
component model of the system is not available.  
Methods have been developed to combine functional 
modeling with failure analysis. Stone and Tumer developed 
the Function Failure Design Method (FFDM) which was the 
bridge between failure analysis and functional modeling. 
They applied functional models to represent the system 
design and identify potential failure states for each function 
[34, 35]. Grantham et al., estimated the failure likelihood for 
each functional in the system. Lough et al., classified 
functions to high-risk to low-risk based on the consequence 
of failures [36, 37]. The idea of providing function-based 
failure analysis provided some improvements in the design 
of complex engineered systems; however, these methods 
limit the designers of the system to considering only one 
single-fault impact analysis at a time.  
To overcome this restriction and to enable the designer to 
consider multiple function failures effect, the Function 
Failure Identification and Propagation (FFIP) method was 
presented [38-47]. The FFIP method identifies failure 
propagation paths by defining states of function health. This 
approach uses a separate behavioral model simulation to 
show failure propagation paths and failure effects. Typically, 
the modeling language Modelica is applied to simulate 
failure scenarios [48, 49]. However, system models cannot 
be automatically constructed from a description of the 
functional structure of a system and therefore it may not be 
useful in FFIP where multiple designs are investigated.  
McIntire et al. have created IBFM tool (Inherent Behavior of 
Functional Models), to simulate failure scenarios applying 
functions, modes, flows between the functions and 
conditions for transition between the functions. With this tool, 
designers can create a functional model of the system in the 
early design stage and simulate the failure propagation paths 
for the system without developing a separate behavioral 
model [50].  
In our presented framework, we apply the IBFM tool to 
simulate the failure scenarios for different design topologies. 
The following section describes the method to develop a 
functional models to represent a system. 
IV. CONSEPTUAL PHASE 
Fig. 1. The first step in the proposed method is to study the 
requirements and expectations from the system and define 
the functions and flow. We use a graph to represent the 
system functionality and its interaction with the environment. 
We implement the method in Python, because Python is free 
access and provides other tools like NetworkX which can be 
utilized to represent the functional model graphically. Graphs 
provide the designers the ability to represent functional 
models with complicated structure [51].  
Fig. 2. Each graph edge (arrow) represents a flow of material, 
energy, or information within the system and each graph 
node (rectangle) represents a function that acts on the flows 
intersecting it. Fig. 2 provides an example of a graph 
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representation of a functional model consisting of a single 
internal function and three functions. 
Fig. 3. In this paper, the flow has a direction, and uses two 
variables to define the flow: an effort variable, and a rate 
variable. For example, a liquid flow can be modeled as either 
a liquid pressure (effort) or a liquid volume flow rate (rate). 
The function at one end of the flow controls the effort state, 
while the function at the other end controls the flow rate. In 
our approach effort and rate variables take qualitative values, 
such as Zero, Low, Nominal, and High.  
Fig. 4. Each function consists of a set of modes. Mode 
definitions show the different levels of functionality for a 
function, which are usually categorized as operational, 
degraded and failed modes. Conditions determine how the 
flows go from one function to another and basically provide 
the conditions to generate the failure paths. Conditions define 
the transition between modes, e.g. the transition from a 
nominal to degraded state, or from a degraded to failed state. 
In the IBFM approach, all modes and conditions are 
qualitative, rather than quantitative. The conditions that 
regulate a function transitioning from one mode to another 
mode are also flow specific. For example, the operational 
mode of the function “Regulate Gas Pressure” has a “Gas 
High-Pressure” condition that leads to a failed mode. The 
“Gas High-Pressure” condition is only used by functions that 
have a “Gas” flow. Functions, flows, modes, and conditions 
are defined to construct a functional model to be fed to the 
IBFM tool to simulate all system failure scenarios. 
Fig. 5. Our IBFM tool can be applied to simulate failure 
scenarios for a functional model. The IBFM tool is hosted on 
GitHub at https://github.com/DesignEngrLab/IBFM. The 
repository contains the module ibfm.py, and a user guide. 
The simulation of each fault scenario begins at the nominal 
state, and then changes the mode of one or more functions to 
a degraded or failed mode. The end state of each scenario is 
recorded for further analysis. The number of unique paths 
that have a particular undesired end state is used in the cost-
risk model described in the following session. 
 
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of a functional model 
 
V. ROBUST VALIDATION 
In this part, a cost-risk model is proposed to evaluate the 
robustness of different designs for a complex engineered 
system. The idea of this cost-risk model is rooted in the risk-
based utility theory [52]. This model studies the tradeoffs 
between cost of designing a system that is resistant against a 
failure, versus the cost of designing the system without 
robustness while accepting the inherent risk of failure. The 
key element is that the “cost of risk” can be quantified, such 
that the trade-off between adding system cost versus 
accepting risk can be made. The proposed model is 
composed of three cost elements: the baseline cost of the 
design, the cost of mitigation, and the cost of risk, given by 
Equation (1). 
Min            ∑
 
                                (1) 
CD: Baseline cost of the design 
CO: Operation cost 
CM: Cost of mitigation 
CR: Consequential cost of the risk 
PR: Probability of risk 
PM: Probability of mitigation 
      : Probability of mitigation failure 
N: Number of undesirable end states 
CD is the cost of design when there are no strategies to make 
the design robust. CM, represents the cost of changing the 
design to make it robust to a particular failure. In the next 
section, we describe four strategies to change a functional 
model to represent different designs for a system. 
Independent of the quality of performance, there is a certain 
cost to operate a system, defined as operation cost, CO.  
With respect to defining the “cost of risk”, we define a risk 
as a triplet of its impact or consequence, its probability of 
failure occurrence, and it’s probability of being mitigated. 
In Equation (1), CR is the impact or consequential cost of the 
risk; in our approach, it is quantified as the cost of having a 
failure (in units of dollars). Secondly, PR is the probability 
of having a specific undesired end state or failure behavior 
and is quantified using the results of failure simulation. It is 
quantified as the number of unique scenarios with a 
particular undesired end state (or fault) divided by total 
number of unique scenarios. Lastly, PM is the probability 
that a design resist against a failure due to a mitigation 
action (a mitigation action is assumed to have a cost of CM). 
Probability of mitigation is also calculated from the failure 
simulation result by adding the mitigation action to the 
functional model and rerunning the simulation. N is the 
number of system undesired end states or failure behavior 
that the system is designed to resist. Except for the nominal 
scenario when all functions perform nominally, other end 
states are failure scenarios and undesired. However, an 
undesired end state does not imply that a failure is present, it 
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may just reflect an end state that prevents the system from 
nominal operation or from completing a mission. For 
instance, when designing a car, having a flat tire is 
undesirable, but may not be classified as a safety hazard or 
failure of the system; however, an engine fire is both an 
undesirable state and a safety hazard. 
Applying the cost-risk model, the designer can determine 
the tradeoff between robustness and cost of a design; the 
cost-risk model is treated as an objective function in an 
optimization framework. In the optimization formulation, 
the objective is to minimize total cost (i.e., Equation (1)), 
subject to any system-level constraints. Treating the search 
for the best system-level design as an optimization problem 
necessitates identifying a termination condition for the 
search. In application, the search would most likely be done 
by a heuristic or stochastic search method, given the discrete 
nature of the functional model representation of the system. 
Since these methods cannot be guaranteed to converge to 
the optimum in finite time, the search must be ended based 
on a heuristic [53]. Termination Conditions for the proposed 
framework can be defined as: 
• An upper limit on the number of evaluations 
(designs) is reached. 
• An upper limit on the time of evaluations of the 
fitness function (cost-risk model) is reached. 
• The chance of achieving significant changes is very 
low. 
If the design meets one or more of the termination 
conditions, it gets selected, otherwise a new design is 
generated and evaluated. 
VI. GENERATE ALTERNATIVE DESIGN 
As noted in previous part, the cost-risk approach is 
implemented as a search problem, in which the objective is 
to find the lowest cost design. An issue to address is how to 
change/modify a functional model to produce other feasible 
designs in the search process. The challenge is identifying 
alternate functional models which are technically feasible, 
i.e., functional models which preserve the key system 
functions and the associated flows. Therefore, a method is 
needed to ensure that functional models evaluated in the 
search process are technically feasible. We propose four 
strategies to generate new design based upon a few simple 
rules used by designers of aerospace systems. The design 
modification rules can be placed into four categories as 
follows: 
A. Redundancy and Health Management   
In this technique, redundancy or health management is 
added to the functional model. The redundancy could be the 
addition of a redundant function, or it could be added in the 
form of partial redundancy. In the case of partial redundancy, 
we may be able to fulfill the needed functionality using 
secondary functions. For example, we may be able to use a 
pressure sensing function to also indirectly fulfill a flow rate 
sensing function in the case that the flow rate sensing 
function is faulted. Adding redundancy or health 
management will affect CM and PM in Equation (1). The 
tradeoff will in general be one in which mitigation cost is 
added to increase the probability of mitigation (and thus 
reduce the cost of risk). 
B. Conceptual Order 
Changing the order of functions is another way to generate a 
new design at the conceptual level of the design. This 
change affects the probability of the risk, PR, by focusing on 
failure avoidance; i.e., arranging the functions is such a way 
that failure propagation path is changed and thus the 
probability of a risk is changed.  
C.  Utilizing Wasted Flows 
In this method, any flows that transfer material or energy to 
the environment (i.e., are not used by the system directly) 
are utilized as additional inputs for other functions where 
applicable. This improves the failure avoidance aspect of the 
design. For example, one could use waste heat to 
supplement a heating function as a mitigation function (CM 
and PM), or one could lower the cost of design of a heating 
function (CD) by coupling waste heat from a different 
function with the heating function.    
D.  Combining/Splitting Functions 
Two or more functions can be combined (or split) to make a 
new design and potentially improve the failure avoidance of 
a system. This could affect both CD and PR. whether 
combining two or more functions into a single function (or 
splitting a single function into two or more functions) 
improves or worsens the cost-risk objective function must 
be determined by the results of failure simulation. 
Combining functions may lead to elimination of a failure 
path (thus reducing PM), or may make the new combined 
function more likely to fail (thus increasing PM). 
We can generate a large space of alternative models by 
using the functions, however a small portion of the space 
can be technically feasible. For instance, by having every 
possible order of functions from initial mono propellant 
propulsion system model, we can generate a large space of 
designs, however having thrust function before heating gas 
is meaningless. Therefore, we narrow down the design space 
to small number of models that could be considered for the 
system. In the following section, we apply the proposed 
approach in early phase of designing a monopropellant 
propulsion system. The goal is to design the system to be 
539 
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robust to events that can cause failure while managing the 
cost. 
VII. CASE STUDY: MONOPROPELLANT 
PROPULSION SYSTEM 
A monopropellant propulsion system refers to a chemical 
propulsion fuel which does not require a separate oxidizer 
and thus can be used in space. Monopropellant designs are 
typically used in the aerospace industry because they make 
the engine lighter, less expensive, and more reliable. In this 
case study, the monopropellant is hydrogen peroxide (    ).  
It is important when designing a monopropellant propulsion 
system to consider environmental condition in space. With 
no gravity assistance, the system should be able to push the 
propellant towards the catalyst. The concept for this system 
design is to apply expanded gas to push the monopropellant 
over a catalyst and produce thrust. This system can be 
divided into three main subsystems: gas, propellant, and 
catalyst. 
When there is a command for a change of the spacecraft 
velocity, the inert gas is heated to expand. The expanded gas 
is fed through regulation and control functions to reach the 
right quantity, pressure and temperature. The expanded gas 
places pressure on the propellant (hydrogen peroxide) and 
guides it to the catalyst. When the propellant passes the 
catalyst, combustion occurs and changes the velocity of the 
spacecraft. Fig. 3, presents the general idea for a 
monopropellant propulsion system design. 
 
Fig. 3. General design for a monopropellant propulsion system 
A. Failure Behavior   
Assume a spacecraft with monopropellant propulsion engine 
has a mission to travel to a planet in outer space and from 
external orbit to the middle orbit and then to the lower orbit 
and take some images and get back to earth. Fig. 4, shows 
different scenarios. When the thrust is commanded, if all 
functions are nominal, the system performs as expected. In 
Fig. 4, the green dot shows the spacecraft accomplished the 
mission. However, there are scenarios in which something 
can go wrong with one or more functions and the result is 
not as expected. Blue, yellow and red dot in Fig.4, 
represents the scenarios that spacecraft ended up with an 
undesired situation. This would cause the engine to provide 
too much (yellow dot), too little (blue dot) or no thrust (red 
dot). In practice, it means the aerospace system passes the 
commanded orbit, or does not reach it. In rare catastrophic 
failures, the system might explode (i.e. loss of system). 
Therefore, the final behavior of failure analysis for a 
monopropellant propulsion system is classified to 5 groups: 
● Mission Accomplished (Desired) 
● Too Much Thrust (Undesired) 
● Too Little Thrust (Undesired) 
● No Thrust (Undesired) 
● Loss of the System (Undesired) 
 
Fig. 4. End states of failure analysis for a monopropellant propulsion 
system 
The first step in our proposed approach is developing a 
functional model. This includes defining functions, and 
flows, failure modes and conditions from transitioning from 
one state to another state.  
Fig. 5, shows the graphical representation of our developed 
model for the monopropellant propulsion system. The boxes 
illustrate the functions required to produce thrust to change 
the velocity of the spacecraft when commanded. The blue 
boxed are the functions implemented by control software. 
The flows are represented by arrows; black arrows represent 
material flow between two function, the material can be 
solid, liquid or gas. The dot blue arrows illustrate flowing 
information or signal between two functions.  Dashed black 
arrow is energy. The definition of the system health states 
(including failure and non-failure modes) and conditions are 
not visualized in Fig. 5, to avoid too much information in 
one graph. The following session describes how to define 
the design in Python and simulate failure behavior. 
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 Fig. 5. Developed functional model for monopropellant system 
A. Functions Definition  
The monopropellant propulsion system model in Fig. 5, 
contains 29 functions and 129 modes. One example of our 
function and modes definition for the monopropellant 
propulsion system in Python is as follow: 
function ImportHeat 
 mode 1 Operational NominalHeatSource 
 mode 2 Degraded LowHeatSource 
 mode 3 Degraded HighHeatSource 
 mode 4 Failed NoHeatSource 
The first line contains the keyword function, followed by the 
desired name of the function. The indented lines contain all 
of the modes of the function. Each line describing a mode 
begins with the keyword mode, followed by a unique 
within-function alphanumeric identifier, followed by the 
function health associated with the mode, followed by the 
name of the mode. Available mode health states 
are Operational, Degraded, and Failed modes. Failed modes 
are the ways, in which the system might fail. A single mode 
in each function definition is followed by the keyword 
Nominal, which by default assigns that mode to be the 
initial mode of the function at the beginning of simulation. 
B.  Flows Definition 
Flows are defined in a single line. Our strategy to define a 
flow is to mention the keyword flow, then the type of flow, 
followed by the name of the category of the flow which can 
be Material, Energy, or Signal. All flows are derived from 
one of mentioned three categories of flows. 
flow Heat Energy 
C.  Modes Definition 
Modes definition is more complicated, as all of the mode’s 
behaviors must be explicitly described. Operational, 
degraded, and failed modes are required to be defined for 
each function. A simple mode definition example is the 
nominal gas source mode: 
mode NominalGasSource 
    InertGas output effort = Nominal 
The first line consists of the appropriate keyword, in this 
case mode, followed by the desired name of the mode. Each 
indented line consists of a single assignment statement. The 
expression to the left of the assignment operator = is 
evaluated to determine the flow variable being assigned to. 
The expression on the right of the assignment operator 
determines the state of the flow variable. Every flow in the 
statement must be referred to using three words: the flow 
type name, its direction, either input or output, and its 
variable, either effort or rate. More complex behaviors may 
be defined by using operators. A single unary operator is 
used in the definition of the “NoGasSource” mode: 
mode NoGasSource 
    InertGas output effort = Zero 
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This mode definition makes use of a constant state. 
Available states are Zero, Low, Nominal, High, and Highest. 
The definition of the drifting low pressure sensing mode 
uses two unary operators: 
mode DriftingLowPressureSensing 
    import NominalConductingRegulatedGas 
    SignalDesiredPressure output effort = RegulatedGas 
input effort - -          
The first one, the keyword import, copies all of the 
statements from the definition of the mode directly 
following the keyword. In this case, the two statements from 
the “NominalConductingRegulatedGas” mode are copied 
into “DriftingLowPressureSensing”. The second one, the 
decrement operator --, decreases the value of the state by 
one qualitative level. 
D.  Conditions Definition  
Condition definitions are similar to mode definitions. They 
name the condition being defined, and explicitly describe 
the behavior, but they only include a single behavior 
statement. Rather than being an assignment, the statement is 
a logical test. For example, the condition to test for a 
function being exposed to high temperature is: 
condition HighTemperature 
    Heat output effort > Nominal 
Logical operators may be combined to form more complex 
tests. All binary operators are evaluated from left to right.  
We simulate all failure scenarios using our developed IBFM 
tool. We tabulate the unique scenarios terminating with 
particular undesired end states. The final behavior of the 
system as shown in Fig. 4, is categorized into different main 
end states. The designers of the system decide what end 
states the system failures could cause.  In this case study, 
undesired end states are:  
• Pass the Mission Location  
• Do Not Reach to Mission Location 
• No System Movement when Needed 
• Loss of the System 
E.  Alternative System Designs  
The baseline design, shown in Fig. 3, represents a functional 
model developed for a monopropellant system in the early 
design phase. In this design, the desired final behavior is the 
mission accomplishment, in which all gas, propellant, and 
catalyst functions operate nominally. Any improvements in 
the functional model influence the final behavior of the 
system. In other words, the baseline model is not designed 
to be robust. Therefore, different system topologies with 
focusing on improvement the robustness of the system can 
be investigated. Improvement strategies include applying 
different levels of redundancy, re-configurability or 
integrated health management sensors in the system design. 
For each design, the failure scenarios can be classified into 
five end states. Fig. 6, represents the Pie Chart for a 
candidate design for monopropellant propulsion system.  
Fig. 6. Classification of failure scenarios for basic monopropellant design 
In this case study, we simulate the failure behavior of the 
initial design and compare it to six alternative functional 
models representing different designs for the 
monopropellant propulsion system. In each alternative 
design, changes are applied in the functional model to 
improve the robustness of the design against some particular 
failures.  
The first modification of the baseline design includes a 
redundant gas rate sensing function. In this design, if no 
signal is coming from the primary sensing function, a 
secondary sensing function can supply the required 
information. The second modification of the initial design is 
an identical system with redundant gas pressure sensing. 
The third modification of the initial design combines the 
adjusting pressure and rate into one function. The fourth 
design uses output heat to expand inert gas (by contrast, in 
the baseline, the heat is exported from the system and 
disappears into space). The fifth design incorporates the 
redundant sensing for propellant. The sixth design applies 
the output thrust heat to preheat the propellant. In this way, 
the propellant plays the role of a cooling system. The 
following section presents the result of failure simulation for 
all six alternative designs and evaluate them based on our 
proposed robust score function. 
VIII. RESULT 
Seven candidate designs for the monopropellant propulsion 
system are examined. In each design, the functional model 
has been modified to be more robust to a particular failure 
or undesired end state. Table 1 shows all the designs 
generated by the functional model modifications. 
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Failure behavior has been simulated for all six alternative 
designed in Table 1. The amount of CPU time required to 
simulate each scenario increases as the complexity and the 
number of faults injected to the model increases. For 
instance, the time of simulation for injecting two 
simultaneous faults is less than the time of simulation for 
injecting three simultaneous faults. In this study, we 
investigate injecting up to 3 faults (all possible three failures) 
in each one of the functional models. Fig. 7, displays the 
classified simulated scenarios for the seed and the six design 
topologies is shown in Fig. 7. In this histogram, the number 
of successful and failed scenarios simulated for each design 
is demonstrated. 
 
Fig. 7. Failure simulation results for candidate monopropellant designs 
The probability of risk in each design is applied to the cost-
risk model of Equation (1). The mitigation cost CM is the 
cost of changing the basic design to make it more robust to a 
particular failure or undesired end state.  
The operation cost CO for all candidate designs is assumed 
to remain the same because on-ground systems cost is the 
main operation cost for a monopropellant propulsion system. 
It’s assumed that regardless of how the system is performing, 
there is an on-ground system to monitor, control and run the 
spacecraft. For other design studies, the operating cost may 
vary by design concept. It is assumed that the aircraft 
completes three missions per year, and for each mission the 
operation cost is $500 million. The number of failed 
scenarios versus the total number of scenarios for each 
design defines the probability of risk, PR.  
TABLE 2. Robust evaluation for monopropellant system candidate designs ($million) 
Cost-Risk Model  Basic Design Design 1 Design 2 Design 3 Design 4 Design 5 Design 6 
Cost of Basic 
Design CD 
100 100 100 95 90 100 80 
Mitigation Cost 
CM 
0 10 10 0 0 20 0 
Operation Cost 
CO 
1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 
𝑪𝑹𝑷𝑹 𝟏 𝑷𝑴  
Cost of Risk  45.50 32.20 30.75 34.90 40.70 21.30 35.20 
Total Cost 1645.50 1642.25 1640.75 1629.90 1630.70 1641.30 1615.20 
Robust Score Rank 7 Rank 6 Rank 4 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 5 Rank 1 
 
TABLE 1. Generated designs for monopropellant system 
Basic Design  The original unaltered system model  
Design 1 Redundant gas rate sensing added 
Design 2 Redundant gas pressure sensing added 
Design 3 Combine adjusting gas pressure and rate into one function  
Design 4 Use output thrust heat to expand inert gas   
Design 5 Redundant propellant pressure sensing  
Design 6 Use output thrust heat to expand inert gas and preheat 
propellant  
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The probability of the mitigation, PM, is the probability that 
the mitigated part does not work when needed. These 
probabilities are quantified based on the IBFM simulation 
and cost numbers are estimated based on the space system 
cost models and data provided by Miller et al. [54]. The 
total cost reflects the tradeoff between designing a robust 
system and the cost of doing so. The lower the total cost, the 
higher the rank of the design would be.  
Table 2 represents the results of robust evaluation for 
developed designs for monopropellant propulsion system. It 
tabulates all the elements of Equation (1). Since there were 
only seven designs to consider, an exhaustive optimization 
algorithm was used; however, an evolutionary or other 
stochastic algorithm could be used to search larger design 
spaces.  
As shown the table, Design 6 has the optimal trade-off 
between robustness and cost. In this design the propellant 
acts as a cooling system. The heat produced by propulsion is 
used to preheat the propellant and expand the inert gas. 
Utilizing this source of energy helps the successful 
combustion process. This design was selected because it had 
the lowest value of the cost-risk objective function. The next 
best design is Design 3, which combines the gas pressure 
and rate control into a single function.  This may indicate 
that since both functions are critical to operation, and a 
failure of either function is highly detrimental to the system, 
it is better to address them with a single function with a 
single failure rate.   
IX. CONCLUSION 
This paper proposed a framework to design a complex 
engineered system in early design phase with the ability to 
resist against failure. We discussed the lack of current 
methods to address failure analysis and robustness of a 
system in the early design phase. Current design methods 
require a detailed component model of a system to be able 
to simulate and study the failure behavior of the system. 
However, such methods are not applicable in early design 
phase when the set of components is not selected yet and 
design is in the conceptual step. Ideally, the strategies to 
make a robust design should be implemented in early design 
phase, because as we go forward in the design process, 
making changes is more expensive and challenging. In our 
proposed method, we showed how to represent a complex 
engineered system with a functional model in early design 
phase. We illustrated how to define functions, modes, flows 
and conditions to simulate the failure behavior of the system 
and how to generate different designs for a system using a 
functional model. Finally, our developed robust score 
function provides the ability to evaluate the trade-off 
between cost and robustness of a particular design and 
search for the optimal one among candidate designs. 
We applied the proposed method in early phase of designing 
an aerospace monopropellant propulsion system. The results 
show that the presented method is a practical design 
framework to conduct failure analysis and develop robust 
complex engineered systems in the early design phase, when 
the complete knowledge of the system components and 
specifics is not available. A future research is needed to 
investigate the proposed approach in a design problem 
where the design space is large and there is a large number 
of feasible candidate designs. Graph grammars could be 
implemented to help generate a large number of design 
alternatives. 
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